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ABSTRACT 
 
Mental Agency and Attributionist (or “Real Self”) Accounts of Moral Responsibility.  
(May 2011) 
Margaret Irene Schmitt, B.A., Saint Mary’s College 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Hugh McCann 
 
 Recently a number of philosophers have begun to promote what are broadly 
referred to as attributionist or real self views of moral responsibility.  According these views a 
person is responsible for a thing just in case it is indicative or expressive of her judgments, 
values, or “world-directed” attitudes.  These philosophers have focused a great deal of 
attention on dissolving the apparent tension between our commonsense intuitions 
concerning the connection between control and responsibility, on the one hand, and our 
lack of voluntary control over our values, beliefs and attitudes on the other.  In attempting 
to relieve this tension, many of them have introduced various forms of non-voluntary 
control or agency we are said to exercise with respect to things such as our values, beliefs 
and attitudes.  I argue that these supposed forms of non-voluntary agency are untenable 
because they typically rest on a failure to adequately distinguish between two ways in which 
we make up our minds; in short, they rest on a failure to adequately distinguish theoretical 
from practical reasoning.  Once certain fundamental differences between theoretical and 
practical reasoning are brought back to the fore of the discussion, it becomes much harder 
to sustain some sort of unique species of agency that can be said to apply to beliefs and 
certain other world-directed attitudes.  Without such forms of non-voluntary agency, 
 iv 
however, proponents of attributionists accounts of moral responsibility seem to face a 
dilemma; they must either: sneak volition in through the backdoor or commit to holding 
people responsible for things with respect to which they are passive.   
 The thesis falls into four main sections.  In the first section, I introduce the problem 
by describing an ongoing debate between defenders of attributionist accounts of moral 
responsibility and defenders of what have been termed volitionist accounts of moral 
responsibility.   In the second section, I explicate Pamela Hieronymi’s construal of the form 
of non-voluntary agency she calls “evaluative control.”  In section three, I critique 
Hieronymi’s account of evaluative control by pointing to two predominant points of 
divergence between theoretical and practical reasoning.  In the fourth section, I examine the 
upshots of the absence of non-voluntary for attributionist accounts of moral responsibility; 
I do so by examining each horn of the dilemma mentioned above.     
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1. INTRODUCTION:  
TWO VIEWS OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY  
 
 Recently there has been a great deal of debate between proponents of what many 
philosophers have come to regard as two predominant (and contrasting) views of moral 
responsibility,1 where the crux of the debate concerns the necessary conditions for moral 
responsibility.  According to proponents of the first—often labeled volitionist—view, an 
agent is responsible for a thing just in case she has directly or indirectly chosen that thing.2  
In other words, proponents of this view maintain that choice, decision, or voluntary control 
is a necessary condition for moral responsibility.  According to proponents of the second—
often labeled attributionist or real self3—view, an agent is responsible for a thing just in case it 
is “indicative or expressive of her judgments, values, or normative commitments.”4  In 
other words, proponents of this view maintain that reflection of one’s underlying character 
(or ‘real self’) is a necessary condition for moral responsibility.   
                                                
This thesis follows The Chicago Manual of Style. 
 
1 For instance, see: Gary Watson, “Two Faces of Responsibility,” Philosophical Topics: 24 
(1996): 227-247; Neil Levy, “The Good, the Bad and the Blameworthy,” Journal of Ethics and 
Social Philosophy 1 (2005): 1-15; and Angela Smith, “Control, Responsibility, and Moral 
Assessment,” Philosophical Studies 138 (2008): 367-392. Watson argues that the two accounts 
are mutually irreducible, while Levy and Smith argue on behalf of volitional and 
attributional accounts, respectively. 
2 The ‘directly’/‘indirectly’ distinction is meant to account for the possibility that the 
responsibility for the thing in question might not rest on a choice for that thing but rather 
on a choice for some other thing which led to or brought about the thing (or state of 
affairs) in question.  The main concern is that there was some choice in the etiology of the 
thing in question. 
3 Susan Wolf coined the ‘Real Self’ label in her book, Freedom Within Reason (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990).   
4 Angela Smith, “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment,” 367. 
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 This latter view can be seen as widening the scope of things for which we are 
responsible; for, while proponents of this view generally agree that we are responsible for 
things we voluntarily choose, they believe we are also responsible for things such as beliefs 
and certain other attitudes that, many would say, are not under our direct voluntary control.5  
Proponents of this view have focused a great deal of attention on dissolving the apparent 
tension between our commonsense intuitions concerning the connection between control 
and responsibility, on the one hand, and our lack of voluntary control over our values, 
beliefs and attitudes on the other.  One of the main problems facing their account has to do 
with finding a way to extend the scope of moral responsibility beyond those things over 
which we possess voluntary control without extending it so far as to include things with 
respect to which we are passive.  For example, while proponents of attributionist accounts 
do want to say we are responsible for a wide range of beliefs and other attitudes, they do 
not want to say we are morally responsible for mental states that have been implanted in us 
by something like an evil demon.6  In other words, proponents of attributionist accounts 
want to retain some control condition for moral responsibility; they just do not want that 
condition to represent a sort of voluntary control.  Thus, in order for their accounts to be 
successful, proponents of attributionist accounts of moral responsibility must do two 
things: (i) develop an account of a unique species of control that can be clearly 
differentiated from voluntary control, and (ii) show that this form of control applies to the 
                                                
5 Robert Adams provides one of the most frequently cited defenses of such a position in his 
article, “Involuntary Sins,” The Philosophical Review  XCIV (1985): 3-31. 
6 Smith discusses these sorts of cases in “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity 
in Mental Life,” 261-262. 
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class of things for which we are morally responsible (whatever this class happens to 
include). 
 This is just what proponents of attributionist accounts of moral responsibility have 
attempted to do.  Many of them have introduced various forms of non-voluntary control or 
agency we are said to exercise with respect to things such as our values, beliefs and attitudes.  
For example, Pamela Hieronymi endorses a particular form of, what she calls, “evaluative 
control,” which “does not sport the usual features” of agency but, she urges, “deserves to 
be thought of as a form of agency” nonetheless.7  Likewise, Angela Smith writes, “the kind 
of activity implied by our moral practices is not the activity of choice but the activity of 
evaluative judgment” (emphasis added).8   Ultimately, these and similar proposed forms of 
agency come to represent some sort of middle ground between voluntary activity and 
passivity, conveniently supporting a wide range of our pre-theoretical intuitions concerning 
both the connection between control and responsibility and the fundamentality of our 
values, beliefs and attitudes in our existence as moral beings.    
 In this paper, I argue that this middle ground is untenable because it rests on a 
failure to adequately distinguish between two ways in which we make up our minds and 
thereby come to form attitudes.  In short, I think proponents of non-voluntary agency 
mistakenly equate the process involved in theoretical reasoning with the process involved in 
practical reasoning.  Doing so has, I think, brought about a great deal of ambiguity 
surrounding the active/passive distinction pertaining to mental happenings, which has in 
                                                
7 “Two Kinds of Agency,” in Mental Actions, eds. Lucy O’Brien and Matthew Soteriou 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 161. 
8 “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics 115 (2005): 236-
271.  Pg. 237.   
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turn brought about an unnecessary muddling of the issues involved in debates on moral 
responsibility.  Once certain fundamental differences between theoretical and practical 
reasoning are brought back to the fore of the discussion, it becomes much harder to sustain 
a unique species of agency that can be said to apply to beliefs and certain other world-
directed attitudes.  In the last section of the paper, I argue that the absence of such a form 
of agency ultimately brings proponents of attributionist accounts of moral responsibility to 
a dilemma: they must either sneak volition in through the back door or commit to holding 
people responsible for things with respect to which they are passive.   
 The rest of the thesis falls into three main sections.  In the first section, I explicate 
Pamela Hieronymi’s construal of the form of non-voluntary agency she calls “evaluative 
control.”  I choose to focus on Hieronymi’s evaluative control because it represents one of 
the most well-elaborated accounts of non-voluntary agency in the literature and also because 
the problems facing Hieronymi’s account of evaluative control are indicative of the 
problems facing accounts of non-voluntary agency quite generally.  In the second section, I 
criticize the close parallel Hieronymi draws between theoretical and practical reasoning.  I 
suggest that there are in fact two points of divergence between these forms of reasoning 
within Hieronymi’s framework of evaluative control.  After explaining these points of 
divergence, I argue that, upon closer examination, there remains little motivation for the 
supposed species of non-voluntary control Hieronymi defends.  In the third and final 
section, I suggest that, if my arguments from the second section stand, proponents of 
attributionist accounts of moral responsibility face the dilemma mentioned above.   
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2. HIERONYMI ON EVALUATIVE CONTROL AND MENTAL AGENCY 
 
 In a series of recent articles,9 Pamela Hieronymi has taken on the project of 
accounting for the particular form of agency we exercise with respect to a wide range of our 
own attitudes as well as the unique sort of responsibility this form of agency yields for us, as 
authors of those attitudes.  This project falls much in line with the one taken on by Richard 
Moran in his influential monograph, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.10  
Moran and Hieronymi are primarily interested in accounting for the class of psychological 
states referred to as judgment-sensitive attitudes,11 rather than occurrent psychological states, 
such as sensations or passing thoughts; and they understand judgment-sensitive attitudes as: 
attitudes which embody a person’s answers to certain world-directed questions.  For instance, they say 
that a person’s belief that p is just her answer to the question of whether p; a person’s fear 
of p is just her answer the question of whether p is threatening in some way; a person’s 
desire for p is just her answer to the question of whether p is worthy of being pursued; a 
person’s intention to φ is just her answer to the question of whether to φ; etc.12  Hieronymi 
                                                
9 The articles include: “The Wrong Kind of Reason,” The Journal of Philosophy, CII (2005): 
437-457. “Controlling Attitudes,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2006): 45-74; 
“Responsibility for Believing;” and “Two Kinds of Agency.” 
10 Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
11 Hieronymi refers to these attitudes as ‘commitment-constituted’ attitudes.  However, I 
will call them ‘judgment-sensitive’ attitudes in this paper so as to remain more consistent 
with much of literature on attributionist accounts of moral responsibility. 
12 While one might object to this way of construing any number of these attitudes on the 
grounds that it’s overly simplistic and fails to take into account important non-cognitive, 
emotive aspects that are likely to underlie the attitudes, I think we can overlook this 
objection for now.  For as long as there remains some cognitive aspect to these attitudes, this 
way of construing them is actually quite helpful.  Hence for this part of the paper, I am 
going to bracket the issues pertaining to the important role of emotions and, instead, focus 
solely on understanding the agency we exercise in establishing the cognitive component of 
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suggests that, in settling these sorts of world-directed questions, one becomes committed to 
one’s answers and thereby open to certain sorts of criticisms regarding the attitudes which 
embody these answers.13   
 In order to ground this vulnerability to criticism, Hieronymi develops an account of 
two distinct forms of agency we are said to exercise with respect to this class of judgment-
sensitive attitudes.14  The first of these is based on the rather straightforward observation 
that, like ordinary objects, our attitudes react in predictable ways with our environment.  So, 
Hieronymi says, insofar as we can think about our attitudes and understand our 
environment, we can control our attitudes in much the same way we control ordinary 
objects.  We control ordinary objects by managing or affecting them according to our own 
purposes via intentional action; in other words, we control them by directing them towards 
a desired end.  For instance, we control our living room furniture by acting upon it in ways 
designed to achieve a particular arrangement we desire.   Likewise, we can control our 
attitudes by taking actions designed to bring about a particular end.15  For example, we can 
take drugs, undergo hypnosis, or solicit the help of friends we think could effectively 
persuade us to form certain beliefs or intentions we desire to have. Hieronymi calls this 
form of control managerial or manipulative control.  
 The second form of control arises from the fact that these attitudes embody a 
person’s answers to world-directed questions, or, as Hieronymi says, that these attitudes 
                                                                                                                                           
these attitudes.  I will address some of the issues related to emotional dispositions in the last 
section of the paper. 
13 Hieronymi provides the most extensive discussions of the nature of this commitment in 
“Responsibility for Believing,” and “Two Kinds of Agency.” 
14 Moran distinguishes between two very similar forms of agency in Authority and 
Estrangement, 113-120. 
15 “Two Kinds of Agency,” 140. 
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embody a person’s take on certain portions of the world.  In order for a person to change 
such attitudes, she must change her answers to the relevant questions or her take on the 
relevant portions of the world.  Hieronymi suggests that one way to change our take on the 
world is to think about the world—about what is “true, important or worthwhile in it.”16  
She argues that when we change our take on things, or change our minds about some 
aspect of the world, we therein change our judgment-sensitive attitudes.  So, she concludes, 
“We might say that we control these aspects of our minds because, as we change our mind, 
our mind changes—as we form or revise our take on things, we form or revise our 
attitudes.”17  Hieronymi calls this second form of control evaluative control.  Both Moran and 
Hieronymi argue that, unlike manipulative control, evaluative control is essentially first 
personal.  While we can exercise manipulative control over our own attitudes as well as the 
attitudes of others (e.g. by drugging them, working to persuade them, etc.), evaluative 
control is exercised exclusively from the first-person perspective.  Thus, evaluative control 
is said to ground our unique responsibility for our own attitudes.  
 
 
 2.1. Evaluative Control as Non-voluntary  
 
 As noted in the introduction, Hieronymi is careful to distinguish evaluative control 
from voluntary control so as to establish the middle ground between voluntary activity and 
passivity on which attributional accounts of moral responsibility rely.  Her argument for this 
                                                
16 “Responsibility for Believing,” 370. 
17 “Two Kinds of Agency,” 140. 
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relies on a distinction she draws between two sets of reasons that can count in favor of a 
judgment-sensitive attitude.  The first are ‘constitutive reasons,’ which bear on the world-
directed question the answer to which the attitude embodies.  The second are ‘extrinsic 
reasons,’ which bear on the question of whether it would be “good, useful, desirable or 
important in some way” to have the attitude.  For example, consider a belief I might have 
that I am a good candidate for a particular job for which I am interviewing.  According to 
Hieronymi, the constitutive reasons for this belief bear on the question of whether I am in 
fact a good candidate for the job; whereas the extrinsic reasons for the belief bear on the 
question of whether having this belief would be somehow beneficial to me (e.g. by 
providing me with confidence for the interview).  
 Hieronymi says that an activity is voluntary “just in case (given the right 
background, and providing all goes well) you do it by deciding to do it, where you can 
decide to do it for any reason you take to show it worth doing” (emphasis added).18  This 
definition of voluntariness allows Hieronymi to exclude judgment-sensitive attitudes from 
the class of things for which we possess voluntary control; for, Hieronymi argues that we 
cannot form these attitudes for any reason that counts in favor of them but rather only for 
constitutive reasons which bear on the world-directed questions the answers to which these 
attitudes embody. Ultimately, the distinction Hieronymi draws between extrinsic and 
constitutive reasons allows her to isolate a class of reasons that count in favor of judgment-
sensitive attitudes but nevertheless cannot be used to form judgment-sensitive attitudes; 
these she calls ‘extrinsic reasons’.  By finding certain extrinsic reasons convincing, one 
would not form a first-order judgment-sensitive attitude (e.g. the belief that I am a good 
                                                
18 “Responsibility for Believing,” pg. 366. 
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candidate for the job) but rather a second-order attitude about the first-order attitude (e.g. the 
belief that it would be useful for me to believe that I am a good candidate for the job).  In 
advancing this argument, Hieronymi appears to be on her way to establishing a unique 
species of non-voluntary control. 
 However, this definition of voluntariness ends up excluding intentions from the 
class of things over which we possess voluntary control as well.  According to Hieronymi, 
an intention to φ is simply the embodiment of a person’s answer to the question of whether 
to φ.  Intentions are thus subject to the same constraint as other judgment-sensitive 
attitudes; for the same extrinsic/constitutive distinction applies to reasons that can count in 
favor of intending.  Constitutive reasons for intending to φ are those that show the action φ 
worth doing, while extrinsic reasons for intending to φ are those that show the intention to -
φ (a psychological state) good to have without showing the action φ worth doing.  For 
example, I might get offered a small sum of money just to intend to jump from the top of 
the Empire State Building without actually having to jump.  In this case, there would be 
extrinsic reasons that bear on the question of whether having the intention to jump is 
beneficial but do not bear on the question of whether to jump.  Just as in the case of all 
other judgment-sensitive attitudes, one cannot intend to φ for any reason that counts in 
favor of intending but only for constitutive reasons that bear on the question of whether to 
φ.  Thus, according to Hieronymi, we can no more intend at will than believe at will.  
 However, I believe this argument relies on an excessively narrow definition of 
voluntariness, which ultimately fails to capture the sense of voluntariness at issue in the 
debates on moral responsibility.  For it seems that most people who are going to grant 
voluntary control at all are going to grant it with respect to our ability to form our own 
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intentions.  I think the conception of voluntariness at issue in the debates on moral 
responsibility corresponds to a more general conception of voluntariness Hieronymi grants 
is at play within her realm of evaluative control.  
 
 
 2.2. Voluntariness at Issue in Debates on Moral Responsibility 
 
 To help clarify the more general conception of voluntariness I take to be at issue, I 
will briefly return to Hieronymi’s discussion of intentions.  According to Hieronymi, 
forming an intention to φ amounts to: settling the question of whether to φ.  But, one could ask, 
what does this settling the question of whether to φ amount to?  In several places Hieronymi 
suggests it amounts to nothing more then deciding to φ; in fact she uses deciding to φ and 
settling the question of whether to φ interchangeably throughout most of her writings.  She also 
says in several places that we can decide to act for any reason we take to count in favor of 
the action (or no reason) at all.19  In other words, we can decide to φ for any of the 
constitutive reasons which bear on the on the question of whether to φ.  So, for instance, 
when considering whether to go to a movie tonight, I might acknowledge several reasons 
that count in favor of doing so.  Going to the movie might provide a much-needed break 
from studying or allow me to reconnect with old friends who are planning to meet there.  I 
might weigh these reasons against other reasons I have for staying home (e.g. needing to 
prepare for the final I have the next morning at 8am).  Ultimately, I might conclude that, 
while the reasons in favor of staying home weigh more heavily, reconnecting with old 
                                                
19144-145. 
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friends is a sufficient reason for going to the movie; thus, I might take seeing old friends for 
my reason and therein decide to go to the movie.  
 It seems to me the fact that nothing requires that we decide to act for one set of 
reasons rather than another is enough to consider deciding to act something we do at will.20  
And, if intentions are something like the psychological byproducts, or termini, of (mental) 
acts of deciding which are themselves voluntary, then forming intentions (and thereby 
intending) is itself something we do at will.  Hieronymi appears to agree with this; she 
writes, “There is, of course, a sense in which we can intend at will: we can decide to φ and 
therein intend to φ.  We can intend to φ by evaluative control, in response to reasons for φ-
ing.”21  She ultimately resists this conception of intending at will, however, and instead 
endorses the more stringent conception of intending at will, wherein to intend at will one 
must be able to intend for extrinsic reasons.   
 However, I find Hieronymi’s basic distinction between extrinsic and constitutive 
reasons and her overall framework of evaluative control more helpful in coming to 
understand the purposive nature of many of these attitudes than in adjudicating the disputes 
surrounding moral responsibility.  For proponents of volitional accounts of moral 
responsibility seem interested in precisely the sort of voluntariness we exercise in deciding to 
act for one set of reasons rather than another.  Cases such as one in which an agent takes 
her future pleasure as sufficient reason for robbing the neighborhood bank, while fully 
acknowledging the reasons against doing so, represent common ground for proponents of 
                                                
20 Hugh McCann provides an extensive and illuminating discussion of how deciding for reasons 
relates to the formation of intentions in chapter 8 of his book, The Works of Agency: On 
Human Action, Will, and Freedom (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
21 “Controlling Attitudes,” 368. 
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attributionist and volitional accounts of moral responsibility.  Thus Hieronymi’s work is not 
done; if she stops here, everyone would simply be talking past one another.  Proponents of 
attributionist accounts would maintain that forming intentions and other judgment-sensitive 
attitudes is not something we do at will while ultimately appealing to the form of voluntary 
control proponents of volitional accounts argue underlies moral responsibility.22  In order to 
arrive at a conclusion regarding the status of our moral responsibility for our attitudes, we 
should examine what happens when we apply this more general conception of voluntariness 
to the larger class of judgment-sensitive attitudes.   
 Hieronymi is ready to concede that, if we use this more liberal conception of 
voluntariness, we could be said to believe at will just as we could be said to intend at will.  
In her article “Controlling Attitudes,” she writes, 
 There is, of course a sense, in which we can intend at will: we can decide to φ and 
 therein  intend to φ.  We can intend to φ by evaluative control, in response to 
 reasons for φ-ing.  (In this sense we can also believe at will—we can believe by 
 evaluative control, in response to reasons which bear on whether p.)23 
 
However, I think Hieronymi draws this conclusion much too quickly.  If we reflect on some 
of the differences between theoretical and practical reasoning, it becomes clear that, even 
on this more general conception of voluntariness, believing, unlike intending, is not 
something we do at will.  
 
 
 
                                                
22 In “The Good, the Bad and the Blameworthy,” Neil Levy argues that both T.M. Scanlon 
and Angela Smith frequently appeal to this sort of voluntary control in defending their 
attributional accounts of moral responsibility.  I agree with him on this point. 
23 “Controlling Attitudes,” 63. 
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3. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL REASONING 
 
 As discussed above, Hieronymi has developed what she takes to be a unique species 
of non-voluntary agency we exercise in forming all of our judgment-sensitive attitudes; she 
calls this form of agency ‘evaluative control’.  However, all she tells us about this evaluative 
control is that it represents our capacity to settle various world-directed questions on the 
basis of constitutive reasons; and, all she tells us about these constitutive reasons is that they 
are those reasons that bear on these world-directed questions.   As a result, her account of 
evaluative control ends up being quite cryptic. The aim of this section is to fill in the gaps 
left by Hieronymi and show how we in fact exercise this ‘evaluative control’ and thereby 
come to settle various world-directed questions on the basis of constitutive reasons.  In 
doing so, I will focus on beliefs and intentions, as they represent paradigm embodiments of 
one’s answer to theoretical and practical questions, respectively.  Ultimately, I point to two 
predominant points of divergence between theoretical and practical reasoning within 
Hieronymi’s framework of evaluative control.  The first relates to the questions that are 
being answered; and the second relates to the way in which the constitutive reasons bear on 
these questions.  
 Recall, the basic framework is this: a belief that p is the embodiment of one’s answer 
to the question whether p, which gets formed on the basis of constitutive reasons one takes 
to bear on the question whether p; and an intention to φ is the embodiment of one’s answer 
to the question whether to φ, which gets formed on the basis of constitutive reasons one 
takes to bear on the question whether to φ.   
 
 14 
3.1 Differences Between Theoretical and Practical Questions 
  
 As I see it, the root of Hieronymi’s problem lies in her failure to acknowledge the 
crucial differences between the various questions being answered in forming judgment-
sensitive attitudes.  She acknowledges that the questions are different in the sense that a 
belief that p is an answer to the question whether p, a fear of p is an answer to the question 
whether p is threatening, an intention to φ is an answer to the question whether to φ, etc.  
However, beyond that, she spends the majority of her time drawing parallels between the 
questions being answered in forming judgment sensitive attitudes.  Throughout most of her 
writings she refers these questions quite generally as “world-directed” questions.  As a 
result, she suggests that these questions constrain our ability to form judgment-sensitive 
attitudes in the same way.  She writes,  
 Intending fails to be voluntary in just the same way believing, resenting and fearing 
 fail to be voluntary.  An intention, no less than a belief expresses a subject’s take on 
 its object—in his case on some possible object.24   
 
The object in the case of intentions is said to be a possible object because it’s something like 
the mental representation of some possible, future action. Hieronymi seems to think that 
such imagery adequately captures the relevant differences between the various questions 
being answered in forming judgment-sensitive attitudes; however, the fact that an intention 
represents one’s take one some possible object as opposed to an actual object has profound 
implications for both the way in which we understand the question that’s being answered in 
forming the attitude and how that sort of question can be answered.  
                                                
24 Ibid., 368.  
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 Hieronymi suggests that the only implication this has is to make intending seem more 
voluntary than believing, fearing, resenting, etc. 25  She writes,  
 Intending can seem more voluntary not only because it is always easy to confuse an 
 attitude with its object (in this case, voluntary action), but also because the question 
 of whether to perform some action or bring about some state of affairs . . . is an 
 extremely permissive one.26 
 
Not only is this an understatement of the implications of having the object of an intention 
be a possible object as opposed to actual object, I think it represents a misconception of the 
nature of intentions.  For it’s not just that an intention is the embodiment of one’s answer 
to a question that affords greater latitude than those involved in other judgment-sensitive 
attitudes; it’s that an intention is the embodiment of one’s answer to a question that is of an 
essentially different kind than those involved in other judgment-sensitive attitudes.  In brief, 
the questions we answer in forming the majority of our judgment-sensitive attitudes have to 
do with our properly understanding some object (or state of affairs) in the world that gets 
imposed on us from without, whereas the questions we answer in forming intentions have 
to do with what sort of object (or states of affairs) we plan to create.27  
 
 
 
 
                                                
25 T.M. Scanlon makes a similar suggestion in What We Owe to Each Other; see especially pg. 
22. 
26 “Controlling Attitudes,” 368 (emphasis added). 
27 In her most recent article—“The Will as Reason,” Philosophical Perspectives 23 (2009): 201-
220—Hieronymi acknowledges the important difference between these questions and 
describes it in much the same way I have here (see pg. 209).   However, she fails to flesh out 
the ramifications of this difference in terms of its impact on our ability to settle the 
questions.  This is precisely what I address in the last part of this paper.       
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3.2. How Constitutive Reasons Bear on Theoretical and Practical Questions 
 
 In order to fully understand the disparate natures of theoretical and practical 
questions, it will be helpful to examine how we answer them on the basis of constitutive 
reasons.  While Hieronymi doesn’t have much to say on this topic, she does make two 
points throughout her writings that seem pertinent.  First, she frequently argues that the 
evaluative control exercised in answering these questions is immediate in a way that 
managerial or manipulative control is not.  In exercising manipulative control, an agent 
takes steps to bring about a desired attitude; for example, she takes a pill or consults a 
hypnotist.  Conversely, in exercising evaluative control, an agent settles a world-directed 
question and therein forms an attitude.  For example, in settling the question whether p, a 
person becomes committed to the truth of p and therein believes that p.  Secondly, 
Hieronymi often explains our settling world-directed questions in terms of our “finding reasons 
convincing.”  For example, in discussing the formation of beliefs, she writes, “If one finds 
convincing the reasons that one takes to bear on whether p, one will, therein, settle the 
question of whether p.”28  In other words, our finding reasons convincing seems to have an 
immediate impact on our settling the question, just like our settling the question has an 
immediate impact on the attitude that gets formed.29  This seems rather uncontroversial.  
                                                
28 “Responsibility for Believing,” 369 (emphasis added). 
29 One might think I am being uncharitable to Hieronymi in emphasizing this second form 
of immediacy—that of finding reasons convincing and therein settling questions. I think this 
is a legitimate criticism with respect to some passages in Hieronymi’s work; however, with 
respect to several other passages, I think my reading is quite accurate.  There is actually a 
great deal of ambiguity surrounding Hieronymi’s notion of what it means to ‘find reasons 
convincing’.  This results from the fact that she seems to use the phrase in two very 
different ways.  In some passages she suggests the reasons do the work, in the sense that the 
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When a person comes to find (what she takes to be) a sufficient amount of evidence for p 
convincing, she typically becomes committed to the truth of p and therein believes that p.  
However, this becomes more problematic when we apply the same schema to intentions.      
 If an intention to φ is the embodiment of one’s answer to the question of whether 
to φ, which gets formed on the basis of reasons in favor of φ-ing one finds convincing, then 
this would exclude the possibility of full-blown akrasia, wherein an agent decides to act 
against her all-things-considered best judgment (as in the cases of my deciding to go to the 
movies and an agent’s deciding to rob the bank discussed above).  For, if an intention to φ 
gets formed immediately upon settling the question whether to φ, and settling the question 
whether to φ occurs immediately upon finding reasons that bear on the question whether to φ 
convincing, there is no point at which the agent could form the intention to not-φ in full 
recognition of the reasons weighing in favor of φ-ing.  However, there are two problems 
with this. Firstly, intentional, akaratic actions are generally considered paradigm instances of 
morally blameworthy behavior (insofar as one accepts the possibility of our being morally 
blameworthy agents).  Hence, it seems that this is just the sort of phenomenon that should 
not get excluded in an attempt to account for the form of agency said to yield our moral 
responsibility.  Secondly, this simply does not correspond to ordinary experience; we often 
(but, hopefully, not too often) decide to act and then proceed to act against our better 
judgment.  
                                                                                                                                           
reasons convince the agent.  In other passages, however, she suggests the deliberative agent 
plays a more prominent role, in the sense that the agent takes something as her reason and 
therein deems it convincing.  I address this ambiguity below.       
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 In her most recent article, “The Will as Reason,” Hieronymi suggests that the 
solution to the problem of akratic intentions lies in the fact that practical reasoning is not 
directed at the question of whether one ought to φ or whether one has most reason to φ, 
but rather (as suggested all along) at the question of whether to φ.  This is meant to 
emphasize that practical reasoning is not a form of theoretical reasoning directed at a 
practical subject matter; practical reasoning is instead reasoning about whether to act.  
Hieronymi takes this to be sufficient to show that forming akratic intentions is possible; she 
writes,  
 We certainly expect a person to be guided, in answering the question of whether to 
 act, by the reasons she acknowledges, when reasoning about her reasons for action.  
 But this expectation may not be met.  It is quite possible (though no doubt 
 irrational) to conclude that you have reason to φ without also deciding to φ, or to 
 decide to φ while acknowledging that you have most reason not to φ.  This happens 
 when the reasons one acknowledges, when reasoning theoretically, are not the reasons that one 
 employs, when reasoning practically.30 
 
However, one has to wonder what it means for an agent to “employ” certain reasons when 
reasoning practically that differ from those she acknowledges when reasoning theoretically.  
Hieronymi does not expound on this claim much at all; however, in describing the practical 
and theoretical ‘employments’ of reason, she writes,  
 . . . these two employments differ in very important ways, and these differences are 
 not simply a matter of the content or subject matter about which one is reasoning.  
 Practical reasoning is not simply theoretical reasoning about actions or reasons for 
 it. Rather, the  two employments differ in what some would call ‘form’.31 
 
Interestingly, Hieronymi goes on to say this difference in form results from the fact that 
theoretical and practical reasoning are directed at “very different kinds of questions.”  
Hieronymi is here referring to the sort of differences I described above; however, she never 
                                                
30 “The Will as Reason,” 207 (emphasis added). 
31 Ibid., 209. 
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goes on to discuss the ramifications of these differences.  She tells us these differences are 
“very important,” but she never tells us how these differences come to bear on her overall 
project.  
 I take the salient ramification to be this: in granting this ability to ‘employ’ certain 
reasons when reasoning practically that differ from those one acknowledges when reasoning 
theoretically, Hieronymi relies on the capacity for choice proponents of volitional accounts of 
moral responsibility argue must be exercised in order for an agent to be morally responsible 
for a thing.  For Hieronymi suggests that, in order to bridge the gap from one’s theoretical 
judgment as to what there is reason to do to one’s decision of what to do, an agent must select 
(however implicitly or unconsciously) the reasons she will employ in practical reasoning; or 
in other words, the agent must select which reasons she will use to justify her action.  If this 
is the case, however, then it seems not only possible for us to exercise some sort of volitional 
capacity in settling practical questions for ourselves but necessary for us to do so.  In other 
words, it seems volition plays an essential role in settling practical questions and forming 
intentions.32  
 One might argue that this is an uncharitable characterization of Hieronymi; for one 
might think there is only a gap between finding reasons convincing and employing them 
when a person is irrational.  In other words, one might think that, insofar as we are rational, 
                                                
32 It should be noted that in “The Will as Reason,” Hieronymi advances an argument against 
referring to a capacity for volition that is separate from our capacity for reasoning.  Instead 
she prefers to speak of ‘reason in its practical employment’.  She has several reasons for 
preferring this, among which is her belief that agents are answerable for all of their activities 
in a particular way—namely, they are answerable to their reasons for those activities.  I use 
the term ‘volition’ throughout this paper simply to refer to a capacity for free choice; I 
remain neutral on whether this capacity is situated in reason or some separate capacity for 
willing.  So this should not be a point of concern for the reader. 
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we do intend immediately upon finding constitutive reasons (or reasons in favor of φ-ing) 
convincing.  In many ways Hieronymi seems to imply this, for she often includes the 
“insofar as we are rational” clause in order to leave room for akratic intentions without 
excluding the immediacy discussed above.33  
 If this is what Hieronymi is implying, I find her account deeply problematic.  For 
she seems to want there to be more ownership over the reasons one ‘employs’ when 
reasoning practically than would be accounted for if akratic intentions resulted from 
something like a breakdown in our rational capacities.  The importance of this ownership is 
quite salient in the arguments she advances in her article, “The Will as Reason,” especially 
her argument against certain accounts of weakness of will which relies on an analogy she 
draws between the weakness of will depicted in those accounts and inopportune muscle 
twitches.  Ultimately, I think Hieronymi is pointing to something more of an active taking as 
one’s reason; and I don’t know how else to think of this except in terms of an ability to 
endorse, or choose one’s reason.  However, if there is a gap in cases of irrationality, wherein a 
person chooses other reasons to employ in practical reasoning then those she acknowledges 
when reasoning theoretically, then why should we think there is not a gap in cases of 
rationality, wherein a person chooses to employ in practical reasoning those reasons she 
acknowledges when reasoning theoretically?  If you allow the gap in the first case but not 
the second, you ultimately give the person more ownership over her akratic intentions than 
her non-akratic intentions.  In other words, you end up failing to give the agent the same 
amount of credit for her praiseworthy intentions that you give her for her blameworthy 
                                                
33 I thank Professor Benjamin McMyler for bringing this potential objection to my attention. 
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intentions.34  In order to avoid such an unsatisfactory asymmetry, we must be consistent 
one way or the other.  Thus, if Hieronymi is going to solve the problem of akratic 
intentions by appealing to volition, or a power to choose one’s reasons, then we should 
assume that an exercise of volition is omnipresent in the settling of practical questions and 
the forming of intentions.   
 But this might not be problematic for Hieronymi, since she was, after all, willing to 
grant that we exercise voluntary control in forming judgment-sensitive attitudes, according 
to the more liberal conception of voluntariness discussed above.  Recall, this form of 
voluntary control is conceived as an ability to establish one’s own attitude by settling a 
‘world directed’ question on the basis of constitutive reasons one (actively) takes to bear on 
that question.  As I see it, the real problem is that Hieronymi is so ready to concede that, if 
we accept this more liberal conception of voluntariness, we can be said to believe (or desire, 
or fear, etc.) at will just as we can be said to intend at will.  In order to understand the 
problematic nature of this claim, we should start by examining what it means to believe at 
will on this account of voluntariness.   
 Hieronymi often speaks of judging in terms of its being the theoretical correlate of 
deciding and thus suggests that, according to this more liberal conception of voluntariness, 
believing at will amounts to judging that p on the basis of constitutive reasons one takes to 
bear on the question whether p.  At one point, Hieronymi goes so far as to say, “ . . . there is 
a ready sense in which we can believe by making a decision.  In many cases, we can consider 
                                                
34 I believe that a person is bound by her conscience and thus always obligated to act in 
accordance with her judgment of what should be done, even if that judgment is objectively 
wrong.  This is why I correlate akratic intentions with blameworthy intentions and non-
akratic intentions with praiseworthy intentions. 
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the evidence for or against p, come to a decision about whether p, and so believe p.”35  
Because this is the same schema that applies to intentions, we can examine a case similar to 
the one of my deciding to go to the movies discussed above.  Suppose that, instead of 
considering whether to go to the movies tonight, I am considering whether I am a good 
candidate for a job for which I am interviewing.  In doing so, I might acknowledge several 
reasons for thinking I am a good candidate.  For example, I might have more education 
than is required for the position or get along well with the president of the company.  I 
might weigh these reasons against other reasons I have for thinking I am not a good 
candidate for the job (e.g. the fact that the job requires careful attention to detail while I am 
more of a “big picture” person).  Ultimately, I might acknowledge that the reasons weigh in 
favor of my not being a good candidate for the job, yet, if judging really is the theoretical 
correlate of deciding, I might instead take the fact that I get along well with the boss as my 
reason and therein judge that I am a good candidate for the job.  If we draw a parallel with 
Hieronymi’s account of akratic intentions, akratic beliefs would be the result of a person’s 
failure to “employ” the reasons in favor of not-p, which she acknowledges when reasoning 
about her reasons for belief, in the process of reasoning about whether p. 
 The problem with this account of believing at will is that the evidence in support of 
my being a good candidate for the job loses its motivational force upon my making the 
higher-order, or ‘all things considered’ judgment that the totality of available evidence 
appears to establish that I am not a good candidate for the job.  For, in acknowledging that 
the totality of available evidence weighs in favor of not-p, one simultaneously becomes 
committed to the fact that the evidence in favor of p does not show p to be the case and thus 
                                                
35 “Responsibility for Believing,” 364. 
 23 
is not suitable for supporting the judgment that p.  In other words, the evidence in support 
of my being a good candidate for the job gets subsumed by the conflicting evidence and 
thus is no longer suitable for serving as a reason at all.  In her book Natural Reason, Susan Hurley 
writes, “The less inclusive probabilistic evidence has no constitutive reason-giving force that 
could hold out in the face of recognition that it’s subsumed by the best probabilistic 
evidence, which favor the opposite conclusion.”36  So, in the case discussed above, there is 
nothing I can take as a reason for judging that I am a good candidate for the job (and hence 
nothing which represents a constitutive reason for the belief that I am a good candidate for 
the job), while in full awareness of my higher order judgment that the evidence suggests I 
am not a good candidate for the job.   
 Kieran Setiya and David Owens have advanced similar arguments against the 
possibility of believing at will.37  Both of their arguments hinge on the impossibility of 
forming a belief freely and deliberately while fully conscious or aware of the fact that the belief 
would be unjustified with respect to the available evidence.  Setiya’s argument admittedly 
rests on the following controversial premise: 
 It is impossible to believe that p or to be confident that p while believing that this degree of 
 confidence or belief is not epistemically justified.38 
However, it is unclear whether this premise is ultimately necessary.  In his article, 
“Epistemic Akrasia,” Owens notes that the possibility of epistemic akrasia is usually taken 
to rest on the following two conditions: 
                                                
36 Natural Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 131-132.   
37 See: David Owens, “Epistemic Akrasia,” The Monist 85 (2002):381-397; and Kieran Setiya, 
“Believing at Will,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXXII (2008): 36-52.   
38 Setiya speaks of this as the “epistemic constraint on belief;” it’s first stated on pg. 43 of 
“Believing at Will.” 
 24 
 Judgment Condition (JC): a person’s first-order beliefs can diverge from her  
            higher-order judgments about what it would be  
         reasonable for her to believe 
 
 Control Condition (CC): these divergent first-order beliefs are freely and  
       deliberately formed 
 
Like Setiya, many people argue against the possibility of epistemic akrasia on the grounds 
that conditions JC and CC cannot be met.  Contrary to this, Owens suggests that JC can be 
(and often is) met but that epistemic akrasia is nevertheless impossible because CC cannot 
be met.39   
 It does seem rather plausible that we might find ourselves with beliefs that we 
consider unjustified or even irrational on reflection.  For instance, I might find myself 
believing that my husband is still alive despite reports that his plane went down over the 
Atlantic or believing, as Scanlon suggests, that my friend is a loyal companion even though I 
recognize he is in fact an “artful deceiver.”  Scanlon and others take such cases as evidence 
for the possibility of epistemic akrasia; for instance, Scanlon writes,  
 Belief is not merely a matter of judgment but of the connections, over time, 
 between this judgment and dispositions to feel conviction, to recall as relevant, to 
 employ as a premise in further reasoning, and so on.  Insofar as akrasia involves the 
 failure of these connections, it can occur in the case of belief as well as in that of 
 intention and action.40  
 
However, Owens argues that there remains an important impediment to epistemic akrasia, 
one that lies in the control condition (CC) rather than the judgment condition (JC).  Since 
akratic behavior is usually taken as an exercise of deliberate agency as opposed to something 
that simply befalls us, it’s not enough that we can find ourselves with irrational beliefs like 
                                                
39 Owens provides an extensive discussion of the control condition and the impossibility of 
epistemic reflective control in his book, Reason without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic 
Normativity (New York: Rutlege, 2000). 
40 What We Owe to Each Other, 35. 
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we might find ourselves stumbling into a stranger as the subway we’re riding makes an 
abrupt stop; rather, as agents, we must play a more prominent role in establishing the 
akratic attitude. 
 Something along these lines is more consistent with the view Hieronymi wants to 
endorse.  As mentioned above, Hieronymi seems to think we play a more deliberate role in 
settling world-directed questions and forming beliefs and other attitudes.  At the end of the 
article, “The Will as Reason,” Hieronymi explicitly distances this aspect of her account of 
judgment-sensitive attitudes from that of Scanlon.  Scanlon describes akratic attitudes as 
mental states that failed to be sensitive to our judgments about what there is most reason to 
do or believe; and in What We Owe to Each Other this ultimately gets spelled out in terms of a 
breakdown in our rational capacities.  For instance, at one point Scanlon writes, “Akratic 
actions (and irrational thoughts) are cases in which a person’s rational capacities have 
malfunctioned, not cases in which these capacities are overmastered . . .”41  Hieronymi finds 
this unsatisfactory and writes in criticism,  
 We will be able to accommodate our peculiar answerability for judgment-sensitive 
 attitudes by understanding them, not merely as attitudes that ought to co-vary with 
 our judgments  about reasons for them, but as themselves embodying our answers 
 to certain questions . . . where that answering is the sort of activity that might have 
 been done for reasons. . .42  
 
Hieronymi repeatedly captures the form of agency that underlies our responsibility for 
judgment-sensitive attitudes in terms of our ability to settle questions (and thereby form the 
attitudes) however we see fit on the basis of reasons we take to bear on those questions.43  
 However, this can be a bit deceiving.  Sure, Hieronymi is correct to suggest that we 
                                                
41 What We Owe to Each Other, 40 (emphasis added). 
42 “The Will as Reason,” 215 (emphasis added). 
43 See, for example, “Responsibility for Believing,” 370. 
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form beliefs on the basis of evidence we see as counting in favor of that belief; in other 
words, she is correct to suggest that we form beliefs on the basis of reasons we take to 
show the actual obtaining of the state-of-affairs that is the object of our belief.  And, she is 
correct to suggest that we do this “however we see fit,” in the sense that we form beliefs on 
the basis of how the evidence appears to us, or how we see the evidence.  But this does not 
imply, in turn, that we can do something like settle these questions and thereby form beliefs 
however we want, or however we desire.  To be sure, Hieronymi is rather clear that it does not 
imply this; however, I think she strategically employs the phrase “however we see fit” 
throughout her writings to indicate a more positive form of agency that does not actually 
exist in the case of beliefs.  
 David Owens argues that, in order for us to exercise the sort of deliberate agency 
Hieronymi describes in forming beliefs, two conditions must be met: (a) believing must be 
purposive and (b) believing must serve a variety of goals.  However, like many others, 
Owens suggests that believing fails to meet condition (b).  Ultimately, it is this failure to 
meet condition (b) that gives rise to the fundamental divergence between believing and 
intending.  However, before I get to discussing condition (b), I would like to with a brief 
discussion of condition (a) and its upshots for Hieronymi’s theory of evaluative control.   
 In his frequently cited essay, “On the Aim of Belief,” J. David Velleman argues that 
believing meets the condition (a), because, when we believe, we aim to represent the world 
the way it is.  Velleman writes, “Belief is the attitude of accepting a proposition with the aim 
of thereby accepting a truth . . .”44  This is a claim that Hieronymi and most philosophers 
                                                
44 In J. David Velleman. The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000) 252 
(emphasis added). 
 27 
accept.  So, I will not worry about defending it here.  Rather, I am more interested in what it 
has to do with Hieronymi’s account of evaluative control.   
 As Owens points out, it is this purposive nature of beliefs that accounts for the fact 
that we cannot simply form a belief that, e.g., the moon is made of cheese upon being 
offered money to form such a belief (unless that money is taken as evidence for the truth of 
the belief that the moon is made of cheese).  Likewise, it’s the purposive nature of 
intentions that prevents us from forming them for any reason taken to count in their favor.  
For, just as the entire purpose of believing is to accept a truth, the entire purpose of 
intending is to settle on a plan of action and carry that plan through in action.  So, the 
reason I can’t form the intention to, e.g., jump over my house in order to win a bet is 
because, in order for me to jump over my house, a number of my general beliefs about the 
state of the world would have to be false.  And it would be futile for me to settle on plans 
of action that, for all I know, I cannot carryout.  
 The reason we can’t form intentions or beliefs for any reason taken to count in favor 
of intending or believing is that these psychological states serve a specific function in our 
lives.  It is not due to any limitation in our agency; rather it is what allows for our being 
agents at all.  Hieronymi often makes similar points; for example, in her article, 
“Responsibility for Believing” she writes,  
 We cannot control our beliefs, intentions, or other commitment-constituted 
 attitudes in the  way we control our actions, not because of any shortcoming in our 
 agency or limitation in our powers, but rather because each of these attitudes 
 embodies our answer to some question other than whether that attitude is in some 
 way good to have or adopt.45 
 
                                                
45 370. 
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So, Hieronymi is correct to suggest that believing is on par with intending, fearing, desiring, 
etc, at least with respect to the first condition mentioned above; for all judgment-sensitive 
attitudes are purposive mental states.  It’s because of the purposive nature of these attitudes 
that they cannot be formed for just any reason taken to count in their favor but rather only 
for constitutive reasons that bear on their corresponding “world-directed” questions.  In other 
words, it’s the purpose nature of intentions and other judgment-sensitive attitudes that gives 
rise to the extrinsic/constitutive reason distinction Hieronymi points to in developing her 
account of evaluative control.   
 However, while Hieronymi is correct to suggest that intending and believing both 
meet the first condition mentioned above, David Owens and Susan Hurley argue that it is 
the second condition that gives rise to the asymmetry between intending and believing.  
Owens and Hurley argue that beliefs, unlike intentions, do not serve a variety of goals in our 
lives.  For example, even though we often act in the pursuit of various ends—e.g. 
sometimes we act for the sake of prudence, while at other times we act for the sake of 
convenience—we never believe in the pursuit of various ends.  Rather we only form beliefs 
for the sake of representing reality, or accepting a truth.46   
 We can illustrate this point of asymmetry by returning to the previous examples of 
intending to go to the movie and believing that I am a good candidate for the job for which 
I am interviewing.  In the case of intending to go to the movie, even if I judge that I ought 
not go to a movie tonight because I have a final exam in the morning for which I need to 
study and doing well on the exam is a superior good to that of seeing old friends, I can still 
                                                
46 While this is sometimes disputed, it is certainly the predominant view.  And it is certainly 
the view Hieronymi holds. 
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view seeing old friends as a good in itself.  Thus, I can still consider the fact that I will get to 
see old friends as a legitimate reason for going to the movie tonight.  Going to the movie 
might not be the prudent or even moral thing to do, but it might be the most desirable or easiest 
thing to do.  Because our actions serve a variety of goals in our lives, I can legitimately 
decide to go to the movies because, or for the reason that, it’s the more desirable thing to do, 
even in the face of my judgment that I ought to stay home.  In discussing a similar case 
involving eating chocolate, Owens writes,  
 When I don’t heed my judgment and do eat the chocolates, my action is still 
 motivated by a  goal whose value is acknowledged in judgment (though outweighed, 
 in the eyes of judgment, by another incompatible objective).  In this respect my 
 akratically eating the chocolates is on par with all the other purposive activities I 
 engage in.  The fact that this action conflicts with my ‘all things considered’ practical 
 judgment need not render it unfree.  And much the same can be said of an akratic 
 intention.47    
 
Ultimately, considerations in favor of φ-ing retain their value in the face of considerations in 
favor of not φ-ing that (are judged to) outweigh them.  As a result, the considerations in 
favor of φ-ing can still be used to settle positively the question whether to φ and thereby 
justify my intention to φ.  In other words, considerations in favor of φ-ing may still count as 
constitutive reasons for intending to φ, if we choose to ‘employ’ them in such a way. 
 Conversely, once I judge that a certain body of evidence points to the truth of p, I 
thereby become committed to the belief that the available evidence does not point to the 
truth of not-p.  As a result, I leave myself without reasons for believing that not-p.  This is 
because, unlike our actions, our beliefs do not serve a variety of goals.  We cannot simply 
believe that p because believing that p is the more convenient thing to believe or because 
believing that p is the more prudent thing to believe.  As Hieronymi would say, values such 
                                                
47 “Epistemic Akrasia,” 388.  
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as convenience and prudence qualify as extrinsic reasons for believing.  They might provide 
motivation, and thereby serve as a person’s reasons, for producing the belief that p by an 
exercise of manipulative control, but they cannot serve as reasons for believing that p.  
Rather, the only thing that counts as a constitutive reason for a belief is something that 
points to the truth of the belief, or the actually obtaining of the state of affairs that is the 
object of the belief.  In a frequently cited passage of her book, Natural Reasons; Susan Hurley 
describes this point of asymmetry between theoretical and practical reasoning in the 
following way: 
 in the case of what should be done there may be conflict within an agent, there may 
be conflicting reasons competing for authority.  But in the case of what should be 
believed, truth alone governs and it can’t be divided against itself or harbour 
conflicts.  It makes sense to suppose that something is good in some respects but 
not others . . . in a way it does not even make sense to suppose that something is, 
ultimately, true in some respects but not in others.48 
 
 So, once I judge that the evidence supports the belief that I am not a good candidate for the 
job, I undermine the conflicting evidence in such a way as to render it impotent for 
supporting the belief that I am a good candidate for the job.  In other words, when I judge 
that the evidence seems to establish that I am not a good candidate for the job, I become 
committed to the fact that the conflicting evidence no longer counts in favor of believing 
that I am a good candidate for the job, or no longer counts as a reason for believing I am a 
good candidate for the job.49 
                                                
48 Susan Hurley, Natural Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) 133.  
49 For a discussion of how truth constrains our ability to form beliefs, see Bernard 
Williams’s seminal article, “Deciding to Belief,” in Problems of the Self, 136-151 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973).   For an argument that denies this sort of asymmetry 
between theoretical and practical reasoning see: Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, “Freedom 
in Belief and Desire,” Journal of Philosophy 93 (1996): 429-449. 
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 It is in this sense that I cannot freely and deliberately form the belief that I am a good 
candidate for the job in full awareness of my higher order judgment that it appears I am not 
a good candidate for the job.  Owens writes,  
 Is there any difficultly about akratically believing a proposition with at least (some) 
 apparent evidence in its favour?  . . . For such a belief to be formed freely and 
 deliberately, the agent must be in a position to judge that a certain bit of evidence 
 provides some reason for the  belief, whilst also judging that this evidence is 
 decisively outweighed by other evidence.  But  no one can freely and deliberately 
 form the belief that p when they think the evidence sufficient to establish its 
 falsehood, because no one can judge that there is any reason to believe p in such a 
 situation.50  
 
So, I cannot form the belief that I am a good candidate for the job via an exercise of 
evaluative control once I make the higher order judgment that the evidence appears to 
establish that I am not a good candidate for the job.  For, according to Hieronymi’s 
definition, evaluative control is exercised when one settles a question and thereby forms an 
attitude on the basis of constitutive reasons one takes to settle the question; and, once I make 
the higher order judgment, I have simultaneously committed myself to the fact that there 
are no constitutive reasons to support the belief that I am a good candidate for the job.  
Again, this is not to say that we do not, on occasion, find ourselves with beliefs we think 
irrational or implausible on reflection.  Such recalcitrant attitudes, however, surely don’t 
qualify as central examples of attitudes we are responsible for on Hieronymi’s account of 
evaluative control and moral responsibility. 
 At this point I believe a short recap is in order.  As mentioned at the beginning of 
this section, I see two predominant points of divergence between theoretical and practical 
reasoning within Hieronymi’s framework of evaluative control.  The first relates to the sorts 
                                                
50 Ibid., 391. 
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of questions being answered in forming judgment-sensitive attitudes; the second relates to 
the way in which we answer those questions on the basis of constitutive reasons.  I think 
the preceding discussion of the impossibility of epistemic akrasia sheds light on this second 
point of divergence in the following way.   In reflecting on the evidence that bears on a 
question of the form whether p, a person may arrive at one of the following conclusions: 
the evidence appears to establish that p is the case; the evidence appears to establish that 
not-p is the case; the evidence is inconclusive.  The issues surrounding the third alternative, 
although interesting, are tangential to the point I wish to make in this paper; so I will 
overlook them here.  However, as I hope to have shown above, in arriving at either of the 
first two conclusions regarding the available evidence, a person undermines the 
motivational force of conflicting evidence and thereby leaves herself without competing 
reasons for belief.  Without any sort of competing reasons, however, there is no point at 
which a person can choose which reasons to employ in justifying a particular belief regarding 
the state of the world.  In others words, there is no gap in which we exercise any sort of 
volitional capacity in settling a question about the state of the world.  I take this to be the 
primary difference in ‘form’ between theoretical and practical reasoning that Hieronymi 
alludes to in the passage presented above.   
  While, in the case of practical reasoning, the will (or our volitional capacity) plays 
what Carlos Steel calls an ‘essential and internal’ role in forming intentions, in the case of 
theoretical reasoning, the will plays an ‘essential but external’ role in forming beliefs.51  The 
will allows us to make practical decisions to do things like gather evidence, direct our 
                                                
51 Carlos Steel, “The Effect of the Will on Judgment: Thomas Aquinas on Faith and 
Prudence,” in The Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day, eds. Thomas Pink 
and M.W.F Stone (London: Routledge, 2004). 
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attention, call things to mind, pursue particular lines of thought, etc.  However, once we 
employ our will in such a way as to  ‘place ourselves in the presence of evidence,’ so to 
speak, the evidence does all the work.   Moran alludes to this when he writes, “With respect 
to my own beliefs . . . there is no distance between them and how the facts present themselves to 
me, and hence no going from one to the other.”52  In other words, we are back to 
Hieronymi’s second form of immediacy discussed above—that between ‘finding reasons 
convincing’ and settling questions.  But, if this sort of finding reasons convincing is all that’s left 
over when (by exercising our volitional capacity) we have done the work to place ourselves 
in the presence of reasons, in what sense can we be said to control the attitude that gets 
formed?  In fact, there seems to be no sense in which we control how convincing we find 
the evidence and thus no sense in which we can be said to control how the question gets 
settled or the attitude gets formed.53  Ultimately, we seem entirely passive with respect to 
the evidence before us.  Thus, there remains no room for any exercise of agency and hence 
no support for Hieronymi’s supposed species of non-voluntary control. 
 
 
                                                
52 Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement, 75 (emphasis added). 
53 It might be that one is predisposed to bias the evidence due to some implicit prejudice or 
latent desire.  In such a scenario, even if one places oneself in the presence of the available 
evidence, one will be unable recognize it as such.  I address this problem below and argue 
that this not something we can (ultimately) control. 
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4. CONSEQUENCES FOR ATTRIBUTIONIST ACCOUNTS OF MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 As I mentioned in the introduction, much of the motivation for attributionist 
accounts of moral responsibility stems from the fact that our values and attitudes play such 
a fundamental role in our lives as moral beings.  This sentiment is reflected throughout the 
writings of proponents of these accounts.  For example, in his seminal article, “Involuntary 
Sins,” Robert Adams writes,  
 Our desires and emotions, though not voluntary, are responses of ours, and affect 
 the moral significance of our lives, not only by influencing our voluntary actions, 
 but also just by being what they are, and by manifesting themselves involuntarily. 
 Who we are morally depends on a complex and incompletely integrated fabric that 
 includes desires and feelings as well as deliberations and choices.54 
 
And similarly, in his hugely influential article, “Freedom and Resentment,” Peter Strawson 
writes,  
 
 The central commonplace I want to insist on is the very great importance that we 
 attach to the attitudes and intentions towards us of other human beings, and the 
 great extent to which our personal feelings and reactions depend upon, or involve, 
 our beliefs about these attitudes and intentions.55 
 
And again, more recently, Hieronymi states,  
 By settling certain questions for oneself, by having a take on what is true, what is 
 important, and what is to be done, one thereby constitutes those bits of one’s mind 
 relevant to the quality of one’s relations with others—and so establishes what we 
 might call one’s moral personality or, in an older but apt phrase, the quality of one’s will.56 
 
                                                
54 The Philosophical Review 94 (1985): 3-31.  Pg. 11. 
55 In Free Will ed. Gary Watson. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). 59-80. Pg. 62. 
56 “Responsibility for Believing,” 361. 
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The views expressed in these passages are not controversial.  There is no doubt that our 
values and attitudes play a central role in our lives, influencing our experience of the world, 
our views of ourselves, and our interactions with other people.  
 However, many of our personal traits influence our experience of the world and our 
interactions with other people.  For example, my height influences my ability to reach things 
on high shelves in grocery stores and thus my interactions with people whom I ask for help 
in getting what I need.  And the fact that I grew up in a certain area of the country causes 
me to have some affiliations but not others.  My penchant for introspection left me 
predisposed to philosophical thinking and ultimately influenced my career decisions.  And 
my poor eyesight prevents me from seeing the world in as fine-grained a manner as many 
other people and in turn has led me to have relationships with various ophthalmologists 
throughout the course of my life.     
 While all of these properties are partly constitutive of who I am and thus influence 
my movement through the world and my relationships with other people, most people 
would agree that I am not morally responsible for all of these properties.  Neither voltionists 
nor attributionists want to hold people responsible things like their short stature or poor 
eyesight.  And, more importantly, neither volitionists nor attributionists want to hold people 
responsible for just any morally salient attitude or characteristic.  As mentioned previously, 
proponents of attributionist accounts of moral responsibility do not want to hold people 
responsible for just any judgment-sensitive attitude, even those that might be sexist or 
racist.  For they do not want to hold people responsible for sexist or racist attitudes that 
have been implanted by an evil demon or a mad scientist.   
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 So how do we identify those character traits a person is morally responsible for?  
Both attributionists and volitionists appeal to our agency in order to ground our moral 
responsibility.  For instance, Angela Smith writes,  
  . . moral criticism, unlike many other forms of moral assessment, seems to imply 
 something about our activity as rational agents. To accuse someone of ‘selfishness’, 
 for example, is not simply to attribute a negative quality to her (like ugliness or lack 
 of intelligence), but to make a claim about her agential activity.57 
  
The real crux of the debate between attributionists and volitionists is what sort of agency 
grounds our moral responsibility.  Volitionists argue that voluntary agency is the only form 
of agency that can warrant full credit for a bad (or good) quality and thus warrant treatment 
as blameworthy (or praiseworthy).  Attributionists, on the other hand, argue that such 
accounts of moral responsibility fail to capture our ordinary practices of ascribing moral 
responsibility, as we only exercise voluntary agency over a small subset of the features for 
which we normally hold one another responsible.58  Starting from what Strawson calls the 
“participant viewpoint,” attributionsists seek to account for our ordinary moral interactions 
by grounding our moral responsibility in a unique species of non-voluntary agency that 
supposedly falls between voluntary activity and passivity and underpins a wider range of 
character traits.59 
 The intuition behind such forms of non-voluntary agency lies in the observation 
that certain values and attitudes, while not under our direct voluntary control, are not things 
that simply befall us, like our height or poor eyesight.  While this seems prima facie plausible, 
I hope to have shown above that such forms of non-voluntary agency collapse on closer 
                                                
57 “Control, Responsibility and Moral Assessment,” 380. 
58 Angel Smith describes our practices of holding one another responsible in her article: 
“On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible,” Journal of Ethics 11 (2007): 564-484. 
59 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment.” 
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examination due to a failure to properly distinguish theoretical and practical reasoning.  The 
aim of this section is to build on (and hopefully further clarify) some of my previous 
comments and show that, without such forms of non-voluntary control, proponents of 
attributionist accounts of moral responsibility face a dilemma; they must either: (a) sneak 
volition in through the backdoor or (b) commit to holding people responsible for things 
with respect to which they are passive.          
 In order to illustrate this dilemma, I will examine what is considered a paradigm 
example of a morally reprehensible attitude on attributionist accounts of moral 
responsibility.  In her article, “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental 
Life,” Angela Smith discusses a case in which an adult person, with an ordinary background 
and stable upbringing, believes that certain human beings are aptly conceived as 
intellectually inferior on the basis of their sex or race.60  Of the case, Smith writes, “ . . . the 
person is open to rational, and in this case moral, criticism for this attitude precisely because 
of its rational dependence on . . . objectionable underlying evaluative judgments.”61  I 
suggest we examine just such a case in getting to the bottom of our moral responsibility for 
such attitudes.  However, to make this case more specific, I’ll use an example discussed by 
Gideon Rosen in his article “Culpability and Ignorance.”  In that article, Rosen speaks of an 
agent, Jones, who is a “run-of-the-mill American sexist circa 1952.”62  Jones encourages his 
                                                
60 The terms “ordinary background” and “stable upbringing” are admittedly vague.  The 
main point is that person was not manipulated by a mad scientist or unusually influenced by 
something like abusive parents. 
61 254. 
62 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series 103 (2003) 61-84.  Rosen begins discussing 
this example on pg. 66 of the article.  It should be noted that Rosen used the name “Smith” 
in this example rather than “Jones.”  I have chosen to use the name “Jones” to avoid 
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sons to go to college, and even saves money for the purpose, but does nothing comparable 
for his daughters.  When asked why he treats his daughters differently, Jones is said to 
respond, “Because they’re girls,” as if it’s an obvious truth that their gender gives rise to 
different intellectual expectations. 
 There are several things that can go wrong in Jones’ cases in order to bring about 
the objectionable attitude(s) expressed in his asymmetrical treatment of his sons and 
daughters.  While proponents of attributionist accounts often suggest that a person’s moral 
responsibility in such cases stems from a failure of rational control or poor rational 
judgment, oftentimes it’s unclear what these failures amount to.  It might be that Jones 
failed to consider relevant facts (or reasons) when forming his beliefs about the intellectual 
abilities of females; or it might be that, even in considering the relevant facts (or reasons), 
Jones failed to be sensitive to the facts (or reasons) in some way.  Let’s assume for the sake 
of argument that there existed at the time a significant amount of research suggesting that 
females tended to do better in school than their male peers and showed signs of equal or 
superior intellectual abilities—enough evidence to rationally support the belief that females 
have intellectual abilities comparable to those of males.  My goal in the next part of this 
paper is to use the Jones example to explore the various ways in which we interact with the 
world (and reasons therein) to form beliefs and other attitudes.  I explain each horn of the 
dilemma facing attributionists—that of sneaking volition in through the backdoor and that 
of holding people responsible for things with respect to which they are passive—by looking 
                                                                                                                                           
confusing the character in this example with Angela Smith, whose work I will be discussing 
throughout this portion of the paper.   
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at two possible scenarios involving Jones’ access to the relevant information concerning 
female intellectual abiltities.   
 In the first scenario, Jones does not have access to the evidence suggesting that girls 
have intellectual abilities comparable to those of males and thus holds the objectionable 
attitude towards his daughters due to being uninformed, or unaware of the reasons for 
believing otherwise.  I argue that there are two possible explanations for why this is the 
case; either: (a) Jones failed to fulfill his epistemic obligations with respect to gathering 
evidence and informing himself, or (b) Jones fulfilled his general epistemic duties with 
respect to gathering evidence but, nevertheless, failed to come across the conflicting 
evidence, or reasons, due to factors beyond his control.  Ultimately I argue that the first 
explanation relies on an exercise of volitional capacities, while the second explanation points 
to things with respect to which Jones is passive.   
 In the second scenario, Jones does have access to the relevant evidence suggesting 
that females have intellectual abilities comparable to those of males but still fails to form the 
proper attitude with respect to his daughters.  I argue that in this scenario there are, again, 
two possible explanations for why this happened.  Either: (a) Jones participates in some 
form of self-deception or manipulative control, or (b) Jones has some sort of breakdown in 
his rational capacities.  As in the previous scenario, I argue that the first explanation relies 
on an exercise of volitional capacities, while the second explanation points to something 
with respect to which Jones is passive.   
 Thus, in either scenario, in holding Jones responsible for his objectionable 
attitude(s) towards his daughters, proponents of attributionist accounts of moral 
responsibility are either sneaking volition in through the backdoor or holding Jones 
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responsible for something with respect to which he is passive.  The overall argument is 
slightly complicated, as it comes at the dilemma indirectly, but the interplay of the various 
scenarios can be summarized in Table 1 below: 
 
Table 1. Reasons for Attitudes: Access and Use  
 
Evidence/Reasons 
Inaccessible  
Evidence/Reasons 
Accessible 
Exercise 
Volition Fail Managerial Duties 
Self-Deception/ 
Manipulative Control 
Passive External Circumstances 
Breakdown in Rational 
Capacities 
 
 
 Before I move on, I should note that I am (painfully) aware that both the Jones 
example and my general argument are incredibly simplified.  There are various complicating 
factors I will be unable to examine in much depth due to the scope of this paper.  These 
complicating factors often lie in unconscious influences resulting from things such as 
emotional dispositions and culturally inculcated sentiments.  While attributionists often 
allow such things to ground our moral responsibility, I argue that oftentimes this is 
problematic.  Due to the magnitude of the issues involved, however, the argument should 
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be viewed simply as a sketch for further development.  My hope is that my discussion at 
least can serve as something of a ground clearing for future debate. 
 
 
4.1. Scenario One: 
 Reasons Inaccessible 
 
 Attributionists tend to place a lot emphasis on our general capacities to (i) interact 
with the world and other members of the moral community and (ii) form standing attitudes 
based on information we perceive and synthesize for ourselves.  For example, Hieornymi 
writes,  
 Because these attitudes embody our answer to some question(s), we exercise a 
 distinct form  of control over them.  While we do not control them in the way we 
 control our actions, they are not, for that states to which we are passive, or simply 
 things we can only affect and manage through our actions, like our furniture or our 
 allergies.  Because these attitudes embody our take on the world, . . . we control 
 them by thinking about the world, about what is or is not true or important or 
 worthwhile in it.  Because our mind changes as our take on the world changes—
 because our minds change as we change our minds—we can said to be ‘in 
 control’ of our [judgment-sensitive] attitudes.63  
 
At first this seems pretty straightforward—we control certain attitudes we have about the 
world by reflecting on the world and drawing our own conclusions.  However, the form of 
control embodied in “thinking about the world” becomes quite complicated when we begin 
to reflect on the many things it might or might not involve.  I will address many of the 
complicating factors in more detail below; but, for now, I think we can point to two things 
it must involve—viz. information to be synthesized and an agent to do the synthesizing.  In 
                                                
63 “Responsibility for Believing,” 370-371.  
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other words, at the most basic level there are reasons for holding various attitudes and 
agents who employ these reasons in taking them to bear on questions and thereby justify 
attitudes.   
 From this we can see that, at the very least, agents must have access to the reasons 
in order to use them in justifying the attitudes they come to hold.  Accordingly, one obvious 
way to interpret the form of control embodied in “thinking about the world” is to think of 
it as physically exploring the world in order to gather evidence or information that can 
provide more justification for our attitudes.  We certainly have epistemic (and moral) duties 
to gather evidence, seek advice, and generally inform ourselves of things such as the state of 
the world, the suffering of others, the cultural and social biases that influence us, and so on.  
And oftentimes these epistemic duties cannot be fulfilled by any other means than actually 
navigating the world—via books, classrooms and town squares.   
 So, if Jones’ objectionable attitude(s) towards his daughters resulted from his being 
generally uninformed about the intellectual abilities of females, it might be that Jones failed 
to explore the world in the right way.  However, Hieronymi is clear that (i) the form of 
control we exercise in physically navigating the world is managerial (or, as the case may be, 
manipulative) control and (ii) managerial (and manipulative) control is characterized by 
intentional action.  So, if my arguments in section two stand, then, as intentional action, the 
form of managerial control embodied in physically navigating the world is something we 
choose (or not) to engage in.  Accordingly, the idea that Jones might have failed to ‘explore 
the world in the right way’, can be understood in two rather different ways.  Either (i) Jones 
flouted his epistemic and moral duties and thereby failed to engage in the required 
exploration process; or (ii) Jones fulfilled his epistemic and moral duties and yet set upon 
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the wrong course in his exploration, thereby failing to come across the available evidence 
(or reasons).  I will argue that the first option involves an exercise of volition on Jones’ 
behalf and that the second option involves circumstances outside of Jones’ control. 
 Firstly, both Smith and Scanlon often ground people’s moral responsibility in their 
having flouted or ignored moral duties.  For example, in explaining the difference between 
moral appraisal and other forms of assessment, Smith writes,  
 Since morally objectionable actions and attitudes involve violations of what we owe 
 to other people, they seem to pose a direct challenge to the moral standing and value of 
 those to whom they are directed.64 
 
And more explicitly, in discussing blameworthy action, Scanlon writes, 
 If an action is blameworthy, then the agent has either failed to take account of or 
 knowingly acted contrary to a reason that should, according to any principles that 
 no one could reasonably reject, have counted against his action.  So, in addition to 
 whatever loss this action may have caused, the agent’s mode of self-governance has 
 ignored or flouted requirements flowing from another person’s standing as someone to 
 whom justification is owed.65  
 
Although, in this passage, Scanlon suggests that a person can ignore or flout a moral 
requirement in either knowingly acting contrary to a reason or simply failing to take account 
of a reason, it’s been argued that the latter alternative—if interpreted as some form of 
ignorance—is not an instance of ignoring or flouting one’s duties.  Neil Levy suggests in his 
article, “The Good, the Bad and the Blameworthy,” that failing to notice (or acting from 
ignorance) cannot be an instance of ignoring or flouting a moral requirement, as the verbs 
“ignore” and “flout” invoke a more robust form of agency than acting from ignorance 
embodies.  Levy argues that, in order for a person to flout or directly challenge a moral 
                                                
64 “Control, Responsibility and Moral Assessment,” 386 (emphasis added). 
65 What We Owe to Each Other, 271 (emphasis added). 
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requirement, the person must both grasp that requirement and deliberately disregard it or 
act contrary to it.66    
 As such an act seems to involve an exercise of choice on the part of the agent who 
is said to ignore our flout their moral requirement, Levy suggests that, in passages such as 
those above, Smith and Scanlon invoke the capacity for volition they seek to avoid; he 
writes, “. . . Scanlon seems covertly to appeal to the very volitionist theory he seeks to refute 
. . . Indeed, the covert appeal to volitional considerations seems . . . a constant of his and 
Smith’s attributionism.”67  So, if Jones’ objectionable attitude resulted from his being 
uninformed about the reasons for believing otherwise than he does and his being 
uninformed, in turn, resulted from his simply ignoring or flouting his obligations, then Jones 
would, at bottom, be exercising his capacity for volition; and thus the objectionable attitude 
would itself rest on an exercise of volition.  
 We can illustrate this by drawing on my previous discussion of Hieronymi’s 
conception of practical reasoning.  In order to flout his moral or epistemic duties, Jones 
must: (a) recognize in the process of theoretical reasoning that his moral and epistemic 
duties provide reasons for performing a certain set of actions {φ1, φ2 . . . φn} related to 
gathering information and keeping himself informed and (b) choose to ‘employ’ other 
reasons in the process of reasoning practically about whether to not-{φ1, φ2 . . . φn}.  So, if 
we were to hold Jones responsible for his bad attitude(s) towards his daughters in this 
                                                
66 The Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 2 (2005): 1-16.  For this discussion of ignoring and 
flouting moral requirements, see pp. 9-10.   Levy is drawing largely on Gary Watson’s earlier 
paper, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme,” in 
Agency and Answerability. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).  
67 10. 
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scenario, then we would ultimately be holding him responsible for an objectionable act of 
volition.                
 On the other hand, Jones’ objectionable attitude might rest on his being uniformed 
of the reasons for believing otherwise and yet not rest (ultimately) on an objectionable act 
of volition.  This could happen for a number of different reasons.  Jones might have sought 
diligently to keep himself informed of the sorts of capabilities his daughters might have that 
could (or should) be promoted by him, as their father.  We could imagine Jones doing a 
significant amount of research or seeking advice from the developmental psychologist in his 
hometown.  However, it might still be the case that, after all of that, Jones failed to come 
upon the relevant evidence indicating that females have intellectual capabilities comparable 
to those of their male peers.  Maybe, in an extreme scenario, much of the data that existed 
at the time resulted from extensive studies that took place in the Netherlands and had yet to 
be published in the US.  Or, in a more plausible scenario, maybe there was evidence to be 
found closer to home that nevertheless failed to be readily accessible to Jones because of 
where he lived and the implicit biases that pervaded that area and kept much of the 
evidence suppressed.    
 In this scenario, unlike the previous one, Jones acts in accordance with duty and sets 
out to inform himself in the required manner; however, in doing so, he nevertheless fails to 
come across the relevant reasons.  This latter failure, however, cannot be seen as something 
for which Jones is at fault.  Like most, Hieronymi and her cohort are rather clear that we do 
not control what happens to be out there in the world around us (unless, of course, we 
manipulate our environment in some way).  So while we can control whether or not we 
investigate things, we cannot control the results of our investigations.   Scanlon writes,  
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 . . . while it is up to us to judge whether appropriate reasons for [an] attitude are or 
 are not  present, it is not generally within our power to make it the case that these 
 reasons are or are not there; this depends on facts outside us.68   
 
So, in this second scenario, once Jones does his part in choosing to act in ways that are in 
accordance with duty, the rest is simply out of his control.  Hence, in holding Jones 
responsible for his objectionable attitude(s) towards his daughters in this case, we would be 
holding him responsible for something with respect to which he is passive; for the 
objectionable attitude would rest on Jones’ being uninformed, and Jones’ condition of being 
uninformed would, in turn, rest on facts outside him. 
  Next I will turn to investigating what happens when Jones both fulfills his duties to 
work to keep himself informed and comes across the reasons to support the opposing, non-
objectionable attitude(s) towards his daughters and yet still fails to form the appropriate 
attitude(s).  I will argue that, even in such circumstances, attributionists face the same 
dilemma of having to sneak volition in through the backdoor or hold Jones responsible for 
something with respect to which he is passive.  
  
 
4.2. Scenario Two:  
Reasons Accessible 
 
 As seen throughout this paper, attributionists are primarily concerned with how 
agents employ reasons to answer questions for themselves and thereby justify standing 
attitudes.  They take this form of agency to be of central concern for ascriptions of moral 
                                                
68 What We Owe to Each Other, 22. 
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responsibility.  As Angela Smith puts it, “. . . moral appraisal . . . makes claims about a 
persons judgmental activity, about the way she recognizes, assesses and responds to 
reasons.”69  Thus, it seems that the real heart of attributionist accounts of moral 
responsibility lies in this realm we are about to examine.  For while there might be various 
things Jones can do to gather information and gain access to the available reasons, most of 
those things are clearly connected to his voluntary agency—as they involve things like 
physically navigating the world, directing his attention, seeking advice, etc.  So, for 
attributionists, the real question of Jones’ responsibility for his attitude(s) lies in what he 
does with those reasons once they’ve been made available to him.  Attributionists tend to 
think this is where the subtler non-voluntary agency comes into play.  However, as I hope to 
have shown above, this is a mistake; for, even here, no such form of non-voluntary agency 
exists.  Building on some of my previous comments, I will show that, as a result, when we 
hold Jones responsible for his objectionable attitude(s) towards his daughters, we are still 
holding him responsible for either an act of volition or something with respect to which he 
is passive.     
 In my previous discussion I treated the question of Jones’ accessibility to the 
reasons in terms of the reasons being something like physically accessible to him—in the 
sense that he physically sought them out and failed to stumble upon them in his search for 
information.  I will now assume the reasons are physically accessible to him—in the sense 
that he has stumbled upon them in his general investigations (overt or otherwise)—and will 
examine what else can go wrong in bringing about his objectionable attitude(s) towards his 
daughters.  Unlike in my previous discussion, I will begin with the ways in which Jones 
                                                
69 “Control, Responsibility and Moral Assessment,” 386. 
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might be passive with respect to the objectionable attitude and then move to discuss the 
ways in which the objectionable attitude might rest on an act of volition.   
 To begin, we should examine what Smith means when she says that moral appraisal 
makes claims about a person’s ability to “recognize” reasons.  Presumably, this ability to 
“recognize reasons” is something like an agent’s ability to recognize that some bit of 
information, or some fact, counts in favor of performing some action or the truth of some 
proposition.  In other words, the ability to “recognize reasons” is something like an ability 
to recognize that some bit of information, or some fact, one stumbles upon actually bears 
on a particular “world-directed” question.  This is pretty intuitive.  Certainly, in order for 
Jones to form the appropriate attitude(s) towards his daughters, he must do something 
more than simply stumble upon the relevant data indicating that females have comparable 
intellectual abilities to those of their male peers.  Jones must also see the data, or 
information, as (i) related to and (ii) evidence for the truth of the proposition: females have 
intellectual abilities comparable to those of their male peers.   
 For example, we could imagine that, in reading the preceding section of this paper, 
someone might have been perturbed by the suggestion that Jones didn’t have access to 
evidence that females have intellectual abilities comparable to those of their males peers 
simply because he didn’t find it in a formal study, or in the advice of the developmental 
psychologist, or even in the sentiments of the people surrounding him.  Many readers might 
have been inclined to respond, “The evidence was there all along.  Jones had enough reason 
to believe his daughters were intellectually capable simply in being their father and 
observing them.  If he had been a sensitive father (and husband), he would have seen that 
the women around him were full of intellectual virtue all along, and he would have felt the 
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need to save for his daughters’ college education just as much as his sons’.”  Thus, one 
might have suggested that the reasons for the opposing, non-objectionable attitude were 
there all along; Jones just failed to recognize them and hence respond to them in the 
appropriate way. 
 This is a very natural sentiment and one that gets embodied in many passages 
throughout the work of attributionists.  Smith and Scanlon often talk about people’s 
sensitivity to reasons.  However, it’s often unclear what this sensitivity to reasons amounts to.  
Usually it’s presented as some sort of disposition to react to one’s environment in various 
ways and see some things as morally or interpersonally salient.  For instance, most people 
see the fact that performing some action φ would inflict suffering on another person as a 
morally salient fact and thus recognize it as something that counts in favor of not-φing.  So one 
might say that, if an agent is properly disposed to the suffering of others, then, in recognizing 
that performing some action φ would cause suffering to another person, the agent also will 
recognize that there is a reason that counts in favor of not-φing.  Accordingly, if Jones’ 
objectionable attitude rests on his failure to recognize the available data indicating that 
females have intellectual abilities comparable to those of males as evidence for the truth of 
that proposition—and thus as a reason, counting in favor of the belief that his daughters have 
intellectual abilities comparable to those of his sons—then it might be that Jones is 
improperly disposed to dissociate females from various intellectual virtues.  As a result of this 
underlying disposition, Jones may be unable to recognize that his daughters are revealing 
intellectual capabilities whenever they do so. 
 But, if we are going to say that Jones’ moral responsibility for his objectionable 
attitude(s) rests on his failure to recognize reasons and his failure to recognize reasons, in 
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turn, rests on his disposition to see women as generally intellectually inferior to men, then the 
next natural question has to do with whether Jones is morally responsible for having the 
objectionable disposition, or what many might call the underlying “sexist character.”  
However, neither Smith nor Scanlon feel it is necessary to address this question.   For 
example, Smith writes,  
  . . . this questions of responsibility (namely, the responsibility one has for becoming 
 a certain kind of person) must be distinguished from the questions of one’s 
 responsibility for the attitudes one in fact holds.  In order to regard an attitude as 
 attributable to a person, and as a legitimate basis for moral appraisal, we need not 
 also claim that a person is responsible for becoming the sort of person who holds 
 such an attitude. That is a separate question . . .70 
 
But this flies in the face of ordinary intuitions about moral responsibility and many of the 
other things attributionists’ have to say about moral responsibility.   
 For example, growing up in the time he did, it is very likely that Jones was 
surrounded by implicit and, oftentimes, overt sexism.  As a result, Jones is likely to have 
culturally inculcated sentiments that, while deeply ingrained and sustained over the years, 
come from sources (largely) outside him.  Most people take such observations as directly 
relevant to the question of Jones’ responsibility for his attitude, even Smith herself.  In her 
discussion of a case very similar to this—one involving a person who has Nazi sentiments 
as an adult after growing up in Nazi Germany—Smith grants that facts about a person’s 
biological nature, childhood upbringing, and cultural surroundings are likely to influence our 
judgments of blameworthiness, if not moral responsibility (understood as attributability).71   
 First of all, I think this move to deemphasize a person’s blameworthiness for her 
objectionable attitude in such cases is indicative of  (at the very least) an inclination to lessen 
                                                
70 “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” 267-268. 
71 Ibid., 266. 
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the degree to which the person is morally responsible for the attitude.  And, in this way, 
Smith suggests that questions about the source of a person’s character are relevant to 
questions of her responsibility for the attitude—insofar as it might lessen her degree of 
responsibility.  But, regardless, I think this move to deemphasize blameworthiness is 
generally unhelpful for proponents of attributionist accounts of moral responsibility; for 
proponents of these accounts maintain that moral responsibility simpliciter is grounded in a 
person’s (non-voluntary) agency.  But if a specific exercise of this (supposed non-voluntary) 
agency ultimately rests on, and is caused by, a disposition that has its source outside the 
agent, then in what sense is it a form of agency anymore—non-voluntary or otherwise?  It 
seems that a person’s biological nature, upbringing, and cultural surroundings are things that 
befall her, like her short stature or poor eyesight.  And thus any of a person’s attitudes that 
(ultimately) rest on these sorts of influences, (ultimately) rest on things with respect to 
which the person is passive. Hence, if Jones’ moral responsibility for his objectionable 
attitude(s) is said to rest on an exercise of some form of non-voluntary (or rational) agency 
and that specific ‘exercise’ of non-voluntary agency is said to rest, in turn, on a faulty 
disposition that was a product of such things as his upbringing and cultural surroundings, 
then, in holding Jones’ responsible for his attitude, we are holding him ultimately 
responsible for something with respect to which he is passive.  
  Of course, Jones might have chosen to live in an area with a particularly sexist 
culture for the very reason that it was sexist.  Insofar as something like that occurred, Jones 
could be held responsible for any sexist dispositions he developed as a result and thus for 
any sexist attitudes that arose as a result of the sexist disposition.  However, if Jones simply 
happened to find himself in a sexist culture—in the sense that he didn’t choose to the live 
 52 
in the particular culture because it was sexist—then it’s unclear how the disposition could be 
credited to an exercise of agency on Jones’ part.   Maybe at the time social consciousness 
was beginning to rise, and people were becoming more aware of the implicit biases towards 
women as they manifested in various ways.  If Jones had somehow become aware that he 
was likely to have implicit biases towards women that unconsciously influenced his 
perception of their intelligence, he might then have a duty to guard against such distortions 
of perception (in whatever ways were recommended).  However, until Jones becomes aware 
of his implicit bias, it’s unclear how he could be expected to guard against it; for, until he 
becomes aware of it, he won’t know that there is anything there to guard against.72 
 As Levy points out in his article, “The Good, the Bad and the Blameworthy,” 
attributionts might retort that volitionists face a similar problem. For, if volitionists are 
going to ground Jones’ responsibility for his treatment of his daughters in his capacity to 
choose, then, in order for him to be responsible for a particular volitional failure, Jones 
must, in turn, be responsible for the volitional capacity itself.  In other words, Jones’ must 
                                                
72 Recently there has been a move to deemphasize the traditional conception of self-
deception, wherein self-deception is characterized by intentional action; instead 
philosophers have begun to embrace what is considered a more empirically plausible 
conceptions of self-deception, wherein self-deception is understood as the result of 
motivationally biased cognitive processes that often operate subconsciously.  For a more 
detailed account of this view, see: Alfred R. Mele, Self-Deception Unmasked, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001).  And for an interesting discussion of the implications this 
new theory of self-deception has on debates surrounding moral responsibility, see: Neil 
Levy, “Self-Deception and Moral Responsibility,” Ratio XVII (2004) 294-311.  Levy argues 
that, with these new conceptions of self-deception, there are no longer grounds for 
presuming that a person is morally responsible for engaging in self-deception.   While I find 
Levy’s article convincing and productive to the general discussion of responsibility for 
attitudes, I think it is misleading to call the operations of subconscious biasing mechanisms forms 
of “self-deception.”  To me “deception” seems to imply a more overt form of agency than 
we get with any type of subconscious process.  However, this is a more general complaint I 
have with respect to the self-deception literature, rather than Levy’s article itself. 
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have chosen the volitional capacity.  But this, of course, gets into trouble.  For how could 
Jones’ have chosen his volitional capacity without already having that capacity on hand? 
   As Levy suggests, the attributionist thought might be that moral responsibility has 
to bottom out somewhere, so why not have it bottom out in a person’s character rather 
than a volitional capacity?73  We certainly see the moral priority attributionists ascribe to 
personal character reflected in the following passage by Smith,  
 The fact that a person’s evaluative judgments are usually shaped in various ways by 
 her early attachments and environment does nothing to undermine the claim that 
 they are still genuinely her judgments—that is, they are genuine tendencies on the part 
 of the person to place evaluative significance certain features of the situations she 
 confronts.  And it is this feature that makes it appropriate, in principle, to ask a 
 person to defend or disavow her attitudes.74 
 
In reading this however, the first question that comes to mind is: in what sense are they her 
judgments?  While attributionists tend to associate our true selves more closely with the 
emotions, dispositions, judgments, and standing attitudes that together form something of 
an underlying “rational network” than with those parts of ourselves that have resulted from 
our voluntary choices, I guess I side with Kant in thinking that our true selves are more 
closely associated with our practical wills.   
 Accordingly, I agree with Susan Wolf and Neil Levy in thinking that what is most 
important in questions of moral responsibility is what we do once we find ourselves with 
particular normative competencies.  So, we do not need to be responsible for having a 
volitional capacity, in order to say we can be responsible for how we employ that capacity 
once we have it.   As Levy says, “. . . I may not be responsible for whether I am in the 
                                                
73 “The Good, the Bad and the Blameworhty,” 7-8. 
74 “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” 267. 
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responsibility ballpark, but I am responsible for what I do when I find myself there.”75  In 
order for us to consider Jones in the responsibility ballpark—especially one that is 
characterized by an ability to employ reasons in justifying attitudes—Jones must first have 
access to the reasons, both physically and psychologically.   This is where I would like to turn 
next.  My last investigation will concern what might happen once Jones recognizes the 
reasons for believing that females have intellectual abilities comparable to those of males 
and yet still holds the objectionable attitude(s) towards his daughters.  Towards the 
beginning of What We Owe to Each Other, Scanlon defines judgment-sensitive attitudes in the 
following way: 
 Judgment-sensitive Attitude: An attitude is judgment-sensitive if it is part of being the 
        attitude that it is that this complex of dispositions should 
       be sensitive to a particular kind of judgment.76   
 
And similarly in her article, “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental 
Life,” Angela Smith construes judgment-sensitive as: “mental states [that] are linked to 
particular judgments in such a way that, if one sincerely holds a particular evaluative 
judgment, then the mental state in question should (or should not) occur.”77  Both authors 
conceive of these attitudes as mental states that should reflect our underlying judgments 
about reasons, but regrettably might not.  
 So, how should we understand this failure of reflection?  As I mentioned in section 
3.2 Scanlon suggests that, after making a judgment about the available reasons, a person’s 
failure to form the corresponding attitude is caused by a breakdown in her rational capacities.  
                                                
75 My discussion in this paragraph and the one before it is deeply indebted to Neil Levy’s 
discussion on pp. 7-8 of his article, “The Good, the Bad and the Blameworthy.”  
76 21. 
77 253. 
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Recall, Scanlon says, “Akratic actions (and irrational thoughts) are cases in which a person’s 
rational capacities have malfunctioned, not cases in which these capacities are overmastered . . 
.”78 In giving such an account, however, it seems Scanlon has not only undermined any 
sense of agency but actually indicated a thwarting of agency.  For, if our moral responsibility 
for judgment-sensitive attitudes is grounded in our rational agency (or our ability to make 
rational judgments), then it seems that, in making the appropriate underlying judgment, one 
has exercised her agency in a praiseworthy manner.  The fact that the judgment fails to get 
reflected in the attitude seems beside the point.  To use a Hieronymi-inspired example, it 
would be like someone experiencing an inopportune muscle twitch when trying to grab a 
child out of the way of oncoming traffic.  Thus, if Jones has made the appropriate judgment 
that men are not intellectually superior to women, then he has exercised his rational 
agency—i.e. that form of agency that is said to ground his moral responsibility—in a 
praiseworthy manner.  The fact that there has been some breakdown in his rational capacity 
only seems to thwart the agency he did exercise.  It seems the objectionable attitude is 
something that simply befell him and is thus something with respect to which he is passive.   
 As noted above, Hieronymi finds this aspect of Scanlon’s account of judgment-
sensitive attitudes unsatisfactory.  Instead, she presents an account of rational agency that 
emphasizes our ability to employ reasons in settling questions for ourselves.  If you recall, 
Hieronymi suggests that akratic attitudes are the result of our first concluding that the 
balance of reasons favors, say, the belief that not-p but then employing a reason in favor of 
p to settle the question of whether p and thereby form the belief that p.  I already discussed 
                                                
78 What We Owe to Each Other, 40 (emphasis added). 
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the problems with this account in great depth in section 3.2.  However, now I would like 
briefly to address what I think is actually going on in Hieronymi’s account of akratic beliefs. 
 It seems that when Hieronymi says that a person is “employing a reason” to “settle” 
a question what is actually going on is the person is using a bit of evidence to force an 
answer onto a question.  In other words, instead of rational justification we’re getting 
rationalization.  For example, when I judge that the evidence seems to suggest that I am not a 
good fit for the job for which I am interviewing, I may then seek to justify a belief that I am 
a good candidate for the job by emphasizing to myself that I get along well with the boss; 
but what I am doing is not actually justifying the belief that I am a good candidate for the 
job but rather rationalizing it to myself.  But directing my attention onto selective evidence 
is certainly something I do.  In other words, it is certainly something I voluntarily engage in.   
In fact, at one point, Hieronymi actually classifies this sort of agency as a form of managerial 
control; she writes,  
 You might manage your own attitudes . . . by convincing or persuading yourself that 
 the reasons at hand support an alternative conclusion.  You might intentionally direct 
 your attention in certain ways, or provide yourself with alternative interpretations of 
 your situation, or persuade yourself to ‘see things differently,’ or take steps to 
 convince yourself that your own previous response is unjustified or that an alternative 
 response is equally justified.79 
 
As managerial—or maybe, more aptly, manipulative—control, this would be an instance of 
intentional action and would thus qualify as a form of self-deception rather than genuine 
belief formation.  So, if Jones were to engage in something like this after judging that the 
evidence indicated that women are just as intellectually capable as men, he might be 
blameworthy for his attitude(s) towards his daughters; but ultimately his responsibility 
                                                
79 “Two Kinds of Agency,” 152 (emphasis added0.  
 57 
would rest on intentional action and thus on an exercise of volition rather than some form 
of non-voluntary control.    
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
 Like many philosophical projects, the attributionist project begins with a puzzle 
from ordinary experience.  The puzzle goes something as follows.  On one hand, we often 
assume people can be responsible only for what is voluntary.  But, on the other hand, we 
often hold people responsible for their beliefs and other attitudes, which many people think 
are not under our direct voluntary control.  The proposed solution to the puzzle lies in the 
observation that, although beliefs and other such attitudes are not under our direct 
voluntary control, they are not the sorts of things that simply befall us, like a short stature 
or poor hearing.  In response, attributionists suggest that we exercise a unique species of 
non-voluntary agency with respect to many of our beliefs and other attitudes and are thus 
appropriate subjects of moral praise and blame on account of such attitudes.  
 In this paper, I hope to have shown that such forms of non-voluntary control or 
agency are untenable because they rest on a failure to adequately distinguish theoretical and 
practical reasoning.  Once that distinction is restored and we examine theoretical reasoning 
more carefully, it becomes much harder to see how we are active with respect to forming 
beliefs many other of our attitudes.  We are certainly active with respect to gathering 
evidence, directing our attention, pursuing certain lines of thought, etc.  However, these 
activities represent indirect forms of what Hieronymi calls ‘managerial’ control and thus 
qualify as intentional, voluntary action.  Once we have exercised such indirect forms of 
voluntary control, it is no longer up to us how the world-directed questions get settled and 
the beliefs get formed.  Thus it seems there is no unique species of non-voluntary control 
we exercise in forming beliefs and many other attitudes.    
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 Ultimately, if proponents of attributional accounts of moral responsibility are unable 
to sustain some form of non-voluntary agency or control, they seem to face a dilemma: they 
must either sneak volition in through the back door or commit to holding people 
responsible for things with respect to which they are passive.  In the case of practical 
reasoning, there is always a choice of which reasons to ‘employ;’ so, in holding a person 
responsible for her intentions, it seems we are always holding her responsible for an act of 
volition.  In the case of theoretical reasoning, on the other hand, a person cannot select her 
reasons for belief; for the reasons are always determined beforehand.  Although in some 
cases a person might ‘choose’ her reasons for belief by directing her attention to selective 
evidence, this only occurs when the person aims to pervert her own beliefs and form a 
picture of the world the way she wants it to be rather than the way it is.  In those cases, the 
person would be engaging in a form of self-deception rather than genuine belief formation.  
If we were to hold her responsible for the resulting belief, we would be holding her 
responsible for an act of volition rather than some unique act of belief formation.  In most 
cases, however, we do not ‘choose’ which reasons to employ in forming our beliefs; instead, 
we lets the reasons do the work.  If we hold people responsible for their beliefs in those 
sorts of cases, we would ultimately be holding them responsible for something with respect 
to which they are passive.   
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